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Platonic ethics 
C. C. W. TAYLOR 
The fundamental question of Platonic ethics is 'How should one live?' 
(Republic i.352d, Gorgias 500c). That question is not to be understood as 
'What is the morally best way to live?', as is shown by the fact that in Rep. 1 
an appropriate, though in Plato's view false, answer to it is that given by 
Thrasymachus, namely that one should live by emancipating oneself to the 
best of one's ability from the restraints of morality with a view to the further-
ance of one's own interest. Rather it is to be understood as 'How may one 
achieve the life which is, objectively, but from the point of view of one's own 
interest, the most worth living?' (Rep. 1.344e). The Greek term for the 
achievement of such a life is eudaimonia (literally 'having a favourable 
guardian spirit' (daimön)), conventionally translated 'happiness', but in view 
of its objective character better rendered 'blessedness' or 'well-being'. 
According to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics (EN) 1095318-20) it was uni -
versally acknowledged (a) that eudaimonia was the supreme good and (b) 
that the term meant 'living well' and 'doing well'; nothing in the texts of 
Plato suggests that his use of the term conflicts with these claims. In the 
same passage Aristotle tells us that there were substantive disputes about 
what living well amounted to, some holding, for example, that it consists in 
acquiring wealth, others that it consists in a life of honour or of intellectual 
achievement; Plato depicts such substantive disputes in Socrates' confronta-
tions with Thrasymachus in Rep. 1 and Callicles in the Gorgias. 
The agreement on 'How is one to live well?' as the basic question of ethics 
forecloses certain ethical disputes while leaving others open. Most funda-
mentally. ethical questions are approached from the standpoint of the indi-
vidual's interest, the promotion of which is assumed to be the primary 
function of the individual's practical rationality. On that assumption one has 
adequate reason to undertake any action if and only if so doing will contrib-
ute to one's living well, i.e. to one's having an objectively worthwhile life. The 
conception of an objectively worthwhile life should not be construed in a 
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narrowly egoistic way, since it may be part of an objectively worthwhile life 
that one cares for the good of others, not merely instrumentally, wi th a view 
to the benefits one may expect to gain from such benevolence, but for its own 
sake. Nevertheless, it is broadly egoistic,1 in that it is assumed that the value 
to the carer of that selfless care lies primarily in its contribution to the life of 
the carer, and only secondarily in its contribution to the life of t h e person 
cared for. Since this broadly egoistic conception of the role of practical 
reason is assumed from the outset, there is no room in Platonic though t for 
theories of a Kantian type, which seek to identify moral principles as imper-
atives binding unconditionally on any rational agent in total independence 
of any considerations of the interest of that or any other agent.2 It is there-
fore unsurprising that our texts provide no hint that the very conception of 
that type of theory had so much as occurred to Plato. 
The broadly egoistic starting-point of Plato's ethical enquiries is not, then, 
open to question. By contrast, the status of morality is an eagerly debated 
question in some of his major dialogues. By morality I understand a socially 
regulated system of norms imposing restraints on the pursuit of self-interest 
with the general aim of furthering social co-operation, for which the nearest 
Greek terms are to dikaion and dikaiosunë, conventionally 'the just ' and 
'justice'. The questions 'What is the morally right thing to do?' and 'Which 
is the morally best way to live?' were certainly not unintelligible to Plato, or 
to Greeks of his time generally. They were, however, both distinct from and 
posterior to the fundamental question which we have already identified, 
'How should one live?', i.e. 'How should one achieve the best life for oneself?' 
The former questions were posterior in that, whereas the rationality of the 
pursuit of the best life for oneself was unquestioned (indeed one could go so 
far as to say that that pursuit constituted practical rationality for the 
Greeks), the rationality of the individual's observance of the dictates of 
morality required to be established by showing that the acceptance was 
1
 For a useful discussion of these two varieties of egoism, labelled respectively moral 
solipsism' and moral egocentrism". see Irwin [293], 255. 
1
 This contrast between Platonic and Kantian theory leaves open the question 
whether, in the former, the agent's interest may itself be seen as consisting in the 
acquisition of states of the personality (i.e. virtues) which have value 
independently of their contribution to the agent's eudaimonia. There are 
theoretically at least three possible views on the relationship of virtue to 
eudaimonia: (i) virtue is valuable purely instrumentally. as a means to eudaimonia. 
(ii) virtue is at least partly constitutive of eudaimonia. and is intrinsically valuable 
qua constitutive of eudaimonia. (iii) virtue is valuable both in its own right and as 
either a means to or as a constituent of eudaimonia. I argue in note 21 below that 
(ii) is closer than (i) to giving an account of Plato's view in the early dialogues. I 
know of no evidence to suggest that Plato was aware of (iii) as an alternative to (i) 
and (ii). (EN 109702-5 indicates that Aristotle may have been.) 
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necessary for the achievement of the individual good life. Plato at tempts to 
meet the challenge to provide this justification of morality in the Gorgias and, 
in a much more elaborate and extended form, in the Republic. 
He accepts, then, that morality requires justification, in the form of a 
defence of its rationality, that this justification must be in terms of a broad 
conception of individual interest, and that such a justification can be pro-
vided. The requirement of justification seems an inevitable response to the 
fact that morality is essentially cooperative, requiring sacrifices from the 
individual for the common good. By Plato's time there had been developed 
theories of the social na ture of morality, which attempted to ground moral-
ity in self-interest (in a similar fashion to the theories of Hobbes and Hume 3 ) 
by showing how norms of self-restraint and social co-operation would nat-
urally develop in primitive societies as a device for mutual protection against 
the onslaughts of wild animals or (more plausibly) of unsocialised individu-
als.4 But the success of such theories seems limited. They show convincingly 
why self-interested individuals have reasons to prefer the existence of such 
institutions to a Hobbesian war of all against all, 'since we benefit from one 
another's justice and goodness' (Protagoras 327b). But they are unable to 
show that, given that the institutions exist, each individual benefits more 
from the sacrifices which he or she is required by the norms of the institu-
tion to make than he would do by taking advantage of the sacrifices of others 
to promote his own interest. The sacrifices might be regarded as one's sub-
scription to the mutual security club, which it is in one's interest to pay, since 
the other members would not accept that one should enjoy the benefits of 
membership without paying one's dues. But if one can get away wi thout 
paying, as one fairly clearly can now and again (though not, doubtless, 
always), why pay in those circumstances? Of course, it is unfair not to pay, 
which is a perfectly good reason for someone who is already committed to 
being fair, but the theory was supposed to generate a purely self-interested 
reason for undertaking that commitment, which it clearly fails to do. As 
Glaucon points out (Rep. 362a). the most that the theory can provide is a self-
interested reason for making other people believe that one always deals fairly 
with them, which falls short of a reason for always actually doing so; but the 
latter, not the former, is what is required for the justification of morality. 
These problems reflect a crisis in traditional Greek morality, to which 
5
 Hobbes. leviathan, chs. 13. 17; Hume. Treatise m.ii.1-2. 
* Plato provides examples in the myth in the Protagoras (320c~322d) and in the 
theory proposed by Glaucon in Rep. u (358e-359b): an example independent of 
Plato is the so-called 'Anonymus Iamblichi'. on which see Guthrie ( 3]. 71-4 and 
314-15. For a valuable discussion of the historical sources of this tradition see 
Kahn [106]. 
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Plato's ethics presents a sustained response. Traditional morality recognised 
certain states of character, principally courage, self-control, justice or fair-
ness and piety, as the principal qualities which made their possessor a n out-
standing and admirable person.5 The young were brought up to regard 
possession of these qualities as fine and admirable (kalon) and the lack of 
them as disgraceful (aischron), and their inculcation was the principal a im of 
education.6 These were the most important among the excellences (aretai), 
i.e. those qualities stable possession of which, together with such external 
goods as wealth, position in society and physical health, constituted success 
in life (to eu zên or eudaimonia), which, we have seen, was universally 
acknowledged as the supreme good. But the arguments which we have just 
glanced at show that the claims of certain aretai, notably justice, to be con-
stitutive of the agent's good are at odds with the other-regarding character 
of those qualities. A further difficulty arises from the fact that some of these 
qualities are no less indeterminate in character than eudaimonia itself. Thus 
even if it is granted that success in life requires piety, i.e. a proper att i tude to 
the gods, including respect for those obligations which the gods impose on 
us, there can be apparently irresoluble disputes about what kind of conduct 
really is required by the gods, as in the famous example in Herodotus (in.38) 
of the diverse customs of different nations in the disposal of the dead, a 
central case of religious obligation. Both difficulties may be seen to have 
prompted an emphasis on the distinction between the nature or reality of 
things (phusis) and convention (nomos).7 The lack of coincidence between 
the agent 's interest and the demands of morality leads to the claim that 
while na ture prompts us to seek our own interest, the demands of morality 
spring from nothing but convention (with the implication that the latter, 
unlike the promptings of nature, lack any authority).8 The indeterminacy of 
some of the conventional excellences is similarly attributed to the facts that 
5
 Pindar. Isthmian 8.24-7; Aeschylus. Seven Against Thebes 610: Euripides, fr. 
282.23-7: Xenophon. Memorabilia in.ix.1-5: Plato. Prot. 329c. Meno 73e-74a. Rep. 
427e. etc. (See Irwin [293]. p. 287. n. I.) 
'Self-control' renders sôphrosunê. a term which lacks a precise English 
equivalent. It connotes primarily a proper sense of oneself and one's limitations in 
relation to others, and derivatively various applications of that sense, especially 
control of the bodily appetites. Hence in many contexts, including those provided 
by Plato's tri-partite psychology, it is appropriately rendered 'self-control'. Where in 
this chapter I use the terms 'self-control' and 'self-controlled' they correspond to 
the Greek sôphrosunê and its cognate adjective sôphrôn. but I have not attempted 
total uniformity of usage, preferring sometimes to use the Greek term. (In my 
commentary on the Protagoras ([237]). I prefer the rendering 'soundness of mind'. 
for reasons explained there on pp. 122-4.) h Prot. 324d~326e. 
7
 Principal discussions of the nomos-phusis distinction include Heinimann I54]: 
Guthrie [3]. ch. 4: Kerferd [86], ch. 10. 8 Rep. 359c. Cf. Prot. 337c-d. 
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(a) their requirements arise from nothing more than convention, a n d (b) 
different societies have different conventions.9 
These criticisms of conventional morality should not be assimilated to 
modern attacks on the objectivity of values. Critics who, like Glaucon or the 
sophist Antiphon,1 0 denigrate conventional morality by contrast wi th the 
promptings of nature assume that the latter is a locus of objective value. The 
extreme form of this position is upheld by Callicles, who maintains that 
unrestrained self-assertion is naturally right (phusei dikaion), and t ha t the 
conventional morality (nomai dikaion) which opposes it is, therefore, na tu -
rally wrong, i.e. really or objectively immoral (Gorg. 4830-484C).11 While 
Thrasymachus is not prepared to go that far, he asserts that injustice is a 
form of wisdom and an excellence, in that it gives the agent a worthwhile life, 
while justice is weakness and folly, in that it harms the agent and promotes 
the good of others (Rep. 343D-344C, 348c-e). We have no reason to interpret 
these claims otherwise than as statements of fact. It is significant t h a t the 
earliest application of the nature-convention contrast to morality, at tr ib-
uted to Archelaus, who is said to have been a pupil of Anaxagoras and a 
teacher of Socrates, states simply that ' the just and the disgraceful a re by 
convention, not by nature ' (Diogenes Laertius 11.16; D-K 60A1). Here, wha t 
is purely a matter of convention is what is morally right and wrong, not wha t 
is good or bad; for example there is no suggestion that it is purely (or at all) a 
matter of convention that health is a good state and illness a bad one. Later, 
when the sceptics applied their universal strategy of suspension of judge-
ment to the special case of claims about value, they did not confine their cri-
tique to moral value, but applied it to value generally;12 but that seems to 
have been a post-Platonic development. At Theaetetus I72a-b Socrates 
asserts that 'in matters of what is just and unjust and holy and unholy 
[people] are willing to maintain that none of these things is so in reality 
(phusei) or has its own nature (ousian), but what is agreed on [sc. by each 
community] is the truth for as long as it is agreed'. but contrasts that conven-
tionalism about morals with the position about what is advantageous, where 
'no one would dare to say that what a community lays down as advanta-
geous for itself is so in fact'. That assertion is confirmed by our other evi-
dence: both sides of the dispute about nature and convention accepted that 
genuine values were part of nature, the critics of conventional morality 
attacking its values as spurious because they are merely conventional and 
therefore not part of nature, its defenders urging that on the contrary moral 
values are natural and therefore genuine. We have already noticed one 
9
 Herodotus in.38. 
10
 Diels-Kranz87B44. See Guthrie [3]. chs. 4 (a) (ii) and 11 (5): Saunders [ 107]. 
1
 ' I discuss the point more fully in my [68]. u See Julia Annas' chapter below. 
54 C. C. W. Taylor 
defensive move, the theory (outlined in Protagoras' myth) t h a t moral 
conventions are themselves natural , in that they are strategies for coopera-
tion developed by h u m a n beings struggling for survival in a hostile environ-
ment. But that defence was insufficient, since it failed to show t h a t moral 
value passed the primary test for being natural , namely that of promoting 
the individual well-being of the agent. If his defence of traditional morality 
was to pass that test, Plato had to develop a better theory of the na tu re of 
morality and of human nature, in the hope of demonstrating the objective 
goodness of the traditional virtues via their contribution to the perfection of 
that nature, and therefore to the objectively worthwhile life for the agent. 
In what follows I shall set out what I take to be the main lines of Plato's 
attempt to develop such a theory. I shall distinguish three stages in this 
process: 
i the theory of the early dialogues13 
ii the theory of the Republic 
iii developments subsequent to the Republic 
i The early dialogues 
A central preoccupation of the early dialogues is the search for 
definitions, whether of individual excellences (courage in Laches, sôphrosunê 
in Charmides, piety in Euthyphro), of excellence in general (Meno) or of 
friendship (Lysis), an aspect of life intimately related to excellence and the 
good. In order to understand the prominence of definition in these dia-
logues, and its connection with the theory of the nature of the virtues 
which emerges in them, it is necessary to consider what Plato's Socrates is 
looking for when he looks for an ethical definition. In outline, the project of 
the early dialogues is to give accounts of the traditional virtues which will 
exhibit them as natural goods; to investigate how that project was carried 
out would require close examination of the relevant texts, for which space 
is lacking here.1 4 I must confine myself in this chapter to a bald s tatement 
of the results of that investigation, focusing primarily on the Meno, which, 
though probably one of the latest of the dialogues which I here coun t as 
early, and in its introduction of the theory of recollection transitional to the 
metaphysical dialogues of the middle period, is of all the early dialogues the 
richest in evidence for the Platonic/Socratic theory and practice of defini-
tion. 
A Socratic definition is not. in the first instance, a definition of any of the 
items that might spring to the mind of the modern reader, such as a term. 
1
 ' For the purpose of this chapter I count the following as early dialogues: Apology. 
Crito. Euthyphro. Charmides, iMches. Lysis. Euthydemus. Protagoras. Meno. Gorgias. 
14
 For fuller discussion see my 'Socratic Ethics' in [130]. 137-52. 
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the meaning of a word, or a concept. Ideally, a Socratic definition answers 
the question 'What is . . . ?', where the blank is filled in by a word designat-
ing some quality or feature of agents, such as courage or excellence. So, liter-
ally, what are to be defined are those qualities or features themselves, not 
anything standing for them, as words or perhaps concepts might be though t 
to do. But, of course, we cannot in general draw a sharp distinction between 
specifying what something is and defining or elucidating the concept of tha t 
thing. The concept of F (where 'F' is some general term) is what we under-
stand or possess when we use the term 'F' with understanding, and in some 
cases saying what F is precisely is defining or elucidating the concept of F. 
Thus if I answer the question 'What is justice?' by saying that justice is giving 
everyone their due, I have thereby attempted (however inadequately) to elu-
cidate the concept of justice, in that the answer is intended to make explicit 
what is standardly conveyed by our talk of justice. The ultimate authority for 
the correctness of that sort of definition is the competent speaker of the lan-
guage in which the elucidation is expressed, and the ultimate test which tha t 
authority applies is conformity with his or her linguistic intuitions. In o ther 
cases, however, the question 'What is F?' is aimed to elicit, not an elucidation 
of the ordinary concept of F, but an account of the phenomenon couched in 
terms of the best available scientific theory. For example, 'light is a s t ream of 
photons' is not an elucidation of the ordinary concept of light, i.e. of w h a t 
the standard speaker of English understands by the word 'light'. It is an 
account of what light is. i.e. of what science has discovered light to be, and 
that account presupposes, but is not exhausted by. the grasp of the concept 
which is available to the competent but pre-theoretical speaker of the lan-
guage.15 Hence the ultimate test of its adequacy is not its fit with tha t 
speaker's linguistic intuitions, but its explanatory power, empirical testabil-
ity, or whatever else constitutes the test of a good scientific theory. The form 
of words What is . . . ?' may express the search for a definition of either kind 
(and in any case the distinction between the two is less sharp than the fore-
going over-simplification has suggested16). Precisely what kind of search is 
afoot has to be determined by the context, which cannot be guaranteed to 
provide an unambiguous result. 
We learn from the Euthyphro that a Socratic definition of a given quality 
should (a) specify what is common to all and only those things to which the 
name of the quality applies (5d), (b) specify that in virtue of which the n a m e 
applies to them (i.e. give the nature of the quality, not a mere distinguishing 
mark of its presence) (6d. u a ) . and (c) provide a criterion by reference to 
1 s
 In certain cases the scientific account may even demand revision of the pre-
existing concept, as in cases where the latter itself carries connotations of a 
superseded scientific theory, for example hysteria. lh See Putnam [964]. 
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which disputed cases may be determined (6e). Requirements (a) a n d (b) are 
explicitly endorsed at Meno 72c, where Meno is invited to specify ' t he single 
nature they [i.e. the various types of h u m a n excellence] all have in vir tue of 
which (di'ho) they are excellences', and though the Meno has no th ing to say 
about disputed cases of arete, we have no reason to suppose that t he third 
requirement has been abandoned. These three requirements are satisfied 
alike by conceptual elucidations and by that kind of account which we 
have contrasted with those, and which we might call, traditionally, 'real 
definitions' or, perhaps more informatively, 'substantive or scientific 
accounts ' . 
In the course of the discussion Socrates gives two model definitions, of 
shape and colour respectively. The first of these, 'Shape is the limit of a 
solid' (76a7), is a conceptual elucidation, whereas the second (76d4~5) is 
a substantive account of colour in terms of a scientific theory, namely the 
physiology of Empedocles.17 He says that the latter is inferior to t h e defini-
tion of shape, but he does not say why it is inferior, and it would therefore 
be rash to conclude that Socrates' preference for the definition of shape 
indicates a preference for one type of definition, conceptual elucidation, 
over another, a causally explanatory account. Indeed, the text t h u s far 
gives no indication that Plato is even aware of the distinction between 
those types of definition. So if we are to answer the question 'Wha t kind of 
definition is Socrates looking for in the Meno?', we must take into 
consideration the rest of the dialogue, where, though nothing m o r e is said 
about the methodology of definition, the question 'What is excellence?' is 
answered. Excellence is first (870-893) argued to be knowledge, then 
another a rgument leads to the revision of that account in favour of the 
answer 'Excellence is t rue opinion' (99D-C), an outcome which is further 
qualified by a strong hint at 100a that the former answer gives t h e true 
account of genuine excellence, while the latter gives an account of what 
passes for excellence by ordinary standards. 
W h a t these answers share is a conception of excellence as a cognitive 
state, or more portentously, a grasp of t ru th . We are not concerned with 
the details of the distinction between knowledge and t rue opinion, but its 
essence is the firmness or reliability of the grasp; knowledge is a reliable 
(because systematic) grasp of t ru th , while t rue opinion is an unrel iable 
(because unsystematic) grasp of t ru th . Wha t sort of account of excellence 
17
 'Colour is a flowing out [sc. from the coloured object] of shapes [i.e. physical 
particles of various shapes] symmetrical to vision [i.e. of such shapes and sizes as 
enable them to penetrate the channels in the eye] and perceptible' (76d4~5). (The 
modern analogue would be an account of colour in terms of light waves of 
different lengths.) 
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is provided by the conception of it as a cognitive state? Note that Socrates 
and Meno are not discussing excellence in some theoretical sphere, such 
as excellence at mathematics; the paradigms of excellence in this final 
stage of the discussion are individuals such as Pericles who embody the 
same ideal of success in public and private affairs as Meno had assumed 
from the outset. That is to say, cognitive states are presented as giving an 
account of all-embracing social and political merit, of the state of the 
totally well-rounded, successful and admirable person (= man, by this 
stage of the discussion). In what sense is that person's admirable state a 
cognitive one? The sort of excellence in question is above all practical, 
manifested in action and a whole style of behaviour; it does not seem that 
specification of a cognitive state could give an account of the manifesta-
tion of excellence. In other words, 'knowledge or true opinion' does not 
offer the same kind of account of excellence as 'having a good service, 
ground strokes and volley' does of excellence at tennis, since the latter 
account does precisely specify the kind of actions which manifest that 
excellence, whereas the former does not. Rather, it gives an account of 
what is manifested in excellent performance, as 'co-ordination, stamina, 
courtcraft, e tc ' does of what is manifested in excellent tennis-playing. 
And as that account expresses not an elucidation of the concept of excel-
lent tennis-playing but an empirical theory of the causes of the type of 
play which we count as excellent, so that cognitive account of overall 
human excellence expresses, not an elucidation of that concept, but a 
causally explanatory theory, what we may call the Cognitive Theory of 
Excellence. We find, then, that despite Socrates' expressed preference for 
the conceptual definition of shape over the causally explanatory account 
of colour, the account of excellence which he endorses in the concluding 
section of the dialogue is of a type represented, not by the former, but by 
the latter. 
The aim of our enquiry into the nature of definition in the early dialogues 
was the elucidation of the nature of the theory of virtue to which that prac-
tice of definition is preliminary. That aim has now been achieved in part, 
with the identification of that theory as the Cognitive Theory of Excellence 
(more familiar as the first of the so-called 'Socratic paradoxes', the thesis that 
virtue is knowledge). But that elucidation lacks content without further 
exploration of just what the Cognitive Theory claims. That exploration will 
also, I hope, indicate the connection between the Cognitive Theory and the 
second paradox, the thesis that no one does wrong willingly,18 and also with 
the much-discussed question of the unity of virtue. 
iH
 On the paradoxes see Santas [161]. 
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The Cognitive Theory is a theory to the effect that overall success in h u m a n 
life is guaranteed by the possession of certain cognitive states.19 This theory 
in turn rests on a theory of the explanation of intentional action, which com-
bines to a remarkable degree a staggering audacity and simplicity wi th a high 
degree of plausibility. It states that provided that the agent has a conception 
of what is overall best for the agent, or (equivalently) what is maximally pro-
ductive of eudaimonia (for the agent), that conception is sufficient to motivate 
action with a view to its own realisation. That is emphatically not to say that 
motivation does not require desire as well as belief. On the contrary, Socrates 
makes clear his view (77CI-2, 78b4-6) that everyone desires good things, 
which in context has to be interpreted as the strong thesis that the desire for 
good is an invariable motive. That desire is then conceived as a standing 
motive, which requires to be focused in one direction or another via a concep-
tion of the overall good. Given that focus, desire is as it were locked on to the 
target which is picked out by the conception, without the possibility of inter-
ference by conflicting desires. Hence, given the standing desire, all that is 
required for the correct conduct, i.e. for the manifestations of excellence, is 
the correct focus. And that focus has to be a correct conception of the good 
for the agent, i.e. a correct conception of eudaimonia. 
From this theory it follows immediately, given the conception of excel-
lence accepted in the Meno as what is manifested in excellent conduct, that 
19
 There has been a lively debate among recent commentators on whether the 
Socratic claim is the extreme claim that virtue (i.e. knowledge) is sufficient for 
success in life (i.e. eudaimonia) by itself, or the less ambitious claim that it is 
sufficient given a (modest) sufficiency of those goods which it is beyond the power 
of the agent to procure, for instance good health. The former view is maintained by 
Irwin [293]. 100 and [180]. the latter by Vlastos [184]. and by Brickhouse and 
Smith [179]. The issue seems to me not to be addressed very clearly in the 
dialogues. While the Socratic claim that the good man cannot be harmed (Apol. 
30c. 4ic-d). // taken literally, implies the former view, that view is clearly 
inconsistent with the assertion at Crito 47e that it is not worth living with a sickly 
body, unless we attribute to Socrates the implausible view that virtue guarantees 
good health. He might indeed have held that virtue will minimise the causes of ill-
health by eliminating those which spring from lack of self-control, but it seems 
very implausible that he should have thought that such factors as climate or 
accident could have no effect on one's health. As Irwin points out ([180]. 92-4). 
Socrates does argue at Euthyd. 279-80 that wisdom always makes those who 
possess it eutuchein, so that the wise do not need good luck, but in the context that 
seems to amount just to the claim that knowledgeable practitioners of any skill 
(doctors, etc.) are more successful than the unskilled, and that they do not need to 
rely on luck, as the unskilled do. In general. Socrates' insistence on the paramount 
importance of the state of one's soul (assumed to be within one's control) and the 
comparative worthlessness of other reputed goods (Apol. 28b. Prot. 313a) has the 
outcome that the virtuous agent will need very little from fortune to give him or 
her a totally worthwhile life, but it is pressing the literal reading of the texts too far 
to take him to claim that he needs literally nothing. 
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the traditional virtues are in fact one and the same state of the agent . 
Courage is that stable state which is manifested in the proper handl ing of 
fearful situations, justice the stable state which is manifested in one's proper 
dealings with others, piety the stable state which is manifested in one's 
proper dealings with the gods. And the stable state in question is the same 
state in every case, namely the agent's grasp of the correct conception of the 
good. Indeed, that same state is designated by the non-synonymous names 
of the traditional virtues, whose distinct connotations pick out the distinct 
manifestations of that single state: for example the connotation of the n a m e 
'justice', i.e. 'what is manifested in one's proper dealings with others' , is dis-
tinct from the connotation of the name 'piety', i.e. 'what is manifested in 
one's proper dealings with the gods'. The point of retaining these various 
names is to do justice to the fact that for the achievement of overall success 
in life the same cognitive state has to be manifested in various ways, whether 
in various types of conduct which overlap only partially (for example if all 
courageous actions are self-controlled but not vice versa) or in different 
aspects of co-extensive action-types (for example if all and only just actions 
are pious, their being pious, i.e. appropriate to dealings with the gods, is a 
specific modification of that attribute of the action-type which is their being 
just, i.e. appropriate to dealings with others). But the retention of the names 
of the traditional virtues should not disguise the essence of the theory, tha t 
what is manifested in all these different ways is identical, namely the agent 's 
grasp of his overall good. The 'parts ' of total excellence are not distinct 
motive-forces or tendencies to action, as on the traditional conception, 
which allowed that they might be separable from one another. Nor are they 
distinct cognitive states, for example kinds of knowledge, as knowledge of 
history is a distinct type of knowledge from knowledge of geometry; knowl-
edge of how to treat others and knowledge of how to control one's passions 
are not distinct types of knowledge, but rather different aspects of a com-
prehensive knowledge of how to live, which is what controls one's activity in 
all areas. That is precisely the account of the virtues which the cognitive 
theory of the Meno would lead us to expect, and it is the theory which we find 
explicitly argued for in the Protagoras and implicit in the accounts of indi-
vidual virtues in the Euthyphro. Laches and Charmides.20 
The central claim of the Cognitive Theory, as so far elucidated, is not one 
from which Thrasymachus or Callicles need dissent; that theory claims tha t 
a reliable grasp of the good is sufficient for overall success in life, but is of itself 
neutral between incompatible conceptions of the good. In order to realise 
20
 I discuss the unity of virtue more fully in my commentary on the Protagoras ([237]) 
and in [219]. Vlastos has vigorously contested this account of the doctrine in his 
[264]. For a reply to his main points see the revised edition of my commentary. 
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Socrates' aim of vindicating the traditional conception of virtue it h a s to be 
supplemented by an account of the good, which will show either t h a t tradi-
tional virtue (or a sufficiently close approximation to it) is instrumentally 
necessary for success in life, or that it is as least partially constitutive of it.21 
In advance of that account the Cognitive Theory entails the self-interested 
version of the second Socratic paradox 'No one acts intentionally against his 
overall interest.' The supplementation of the Cognitive Theory wi th that 
account yields the moral version of the paradox 'No one does intentionally 
what is morally wrong.' But when we look for arguments in favour of that 
account, the dialogues provide us with very little. Crito 47e states, bu t does 
not argue for, the analogy between health of the body and justice in the soul, 
asserting that injustice damages the soul as sickness does the body, and that 
as it is not worth living with a sickly and diseased body, even less is it worth 
living with a corrupted soul. On the strength of that analogy it is agreed 
(48b) that living well (the universally acknowledged good) is the same thing 
as living creditably (kalös) and justly (i.e. that the good life is identical with 
the moral life), but Thrasymachus could properly point out that n o argu-
ment has been given for the crucial claims that injustice harms the soul and 
that justice benefits it. Gorg. 504-5 merely gives a more extended version of 
the analogy: all types of craftsmen aim to produce a good product, and in 
21 Irwin argues in [293] (for example on pp. 84-5) that the craft analogy commits the 
Socrates of the early (= Socratic) dialogues to an exclusively instrumental view of 
the relation of virtue to eudaimonia. and treats acceptance or rejection of this 
instrumental view as the criterion for distinguishing between the views of 
'Socrates' and those of 'Plato'. But first, not all crafts (technai) are exclusively 
instrumental in character. A technê is any skilled activity which can be 
systematically taught, a description which embraces the performing arts as well as 
the productive: see. for instance. Symp. 187b (music). Laws 816a (dancing). The 
craft analogy itself, therefore, need not prevent Socrates from claiming both that 
virtue is a technê and that it is at least partly constitutive of eudaimonia. while Crito 
47e shows him firmly committed to the latter claim. So unless Irwin is to attribute 
the view of the Crito to 'Plato' rather than to 'Socrates', he must abandon the view 
that the letter's conception of the relation of virtue to eudaimonia is exclusively that 
of an instrumental means. Irwin's view is criticised by Zeyl in [186]. 
The above is not to say that the position of the early dialogues on the relation of 
virtue to eudaimonia is consistent. As pointed out in the text (p. 63 below), in 
different passages Socrates is represented as maintaining both that virtue is 
knowledge (sc. of the good) and that it is itself the health of the soul, and therefore 
the good itself. Those theses are inconsistent, since knowledge of the good requires 
that the content of that knowledge should be independently specifiable, which is 
impossible if the good of which one has knowledge is the very state of having 
knowledge of the good. The fault, however, lies not with the craft analogy, which 
can be stated without inconsistency as the thesis that success in life is a skilled 
activity analogous to skill in the performing arts, but with the conjunction of the 
claims that excellence is a state of knowledge of how to achieve a goal and that it is 
that goal itself. 
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every case the goodness of the product consists in its order and arrange-
ment. So a well-made boat has all its parts properly fitted together, and in a 
healthy individual all the bodily constituents are properly ordered. As health 
is the name for the proper ordering of bodily components, the name for the 
proper ordering of psychic components is justice and sôphrosunê, which 
expresses itself in proper conduct towards gods and men (piety and justice) 
and in the proper control of pleasure and pain (courage) (507a-c). Once 
again, the crucial identification of the proper order of the soul with conven-
tional justice and sôphrosunê is unargued. It is an appropriate ad hominem 
rejoinder to Callicles that his ideal of the unrestrained satisfaction of the 
pleasure of the moment does not provide an adequate rule for the long-term 
planning of one's life, and that without some such rule one's life will collapse 
into a chaos of conflicting desires.22 To be satisfying one's life must be coher-
ent, and to be coherent it must contain some discrimination of pleasures into 
the more and less significant, and some circumscription of the pursuit of the 
latter with a view to the greater enjoyment of the former. But that element 
of rational planning and self-control might be exercised in the pursuit of a 
life of injustice and self-indulgence; Don Juan could satisfy that requirement 
by making the seduction of as many women as possible his paramount aim, 
and by refusing to be distracted from it by the momentary attractions of a life 
of scholarship or of quiet domesticity. 
Earlier in the Gorgias (473-5) Socrates argues against Polus that injustice 
is against the agent's interest, and hence (by the second paradox) that no one 
acts unjustly intentionally (509e). The argument does not contain any pos-
itive account of the agent's good, but proceeds directly to the conclusion that 
injustice is bad for the agent, relying on Polus' admission that injustice, 
while more advantageous to the agent than justice, is more disgraceful than 
justice: Socrates gets Polus to agree that if χ is more disgraceful than y, then 
χ is either more unpleasant than y or worse (i.e. more disadvantageous) than 
y, and then concludes that injustice is worse than justice via the claim 
(agreed by Polus) that injustice is not more unpleasant than justice. The 
weakness of the argument is obvious; as Callicles points out (482d-e). a 
tougher-minded opponent (such as Thrasymachus) would not have made 
the initial concession that injustice is more disgraceful than justice. Further, 
2 2
 Of course, o n e s only rule for planning one's life might be 'Don't plan: take every 
pleasure as it comes." Such a rule is not formally self-contradictory, nor is the 
description of someone as attempting to live by it. It is. however, practically self-
defeating. in the sense that anyone who tried to put it into practice would find that 
the attempt to adhere to it consistently required him to break it. The reason is that 
some pleasures, as they come, require that one should plan, for example the 
pleasure of getting started on a career. 
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even given that concession, Socrates' a rgument requires the general princi-
ple that if action-type a is more disgraceful to the agent than action-type b, 
it must be either more unpleasant to the agent or worse/or the agent, b u t there 
is no ground to think that that principle is true; an action-type might be dis-
graceful to an agent (i.e. such as to bring him into justified disrepute) which 
was neither unpleasant to that agent nor bad for him, but either unpleasant 
to or bad for others. 
The only other early dialogue which contains any account of the good is 
the Protagoras, where Socrates is represented as arguing for the conclusion 
that courage is a kind of knowledge from the premise that the good is plea-
sure. Without renewing the controversy as to whether this premise is (as I 
believe) presented in the dialogue as Socrates' own view or merely t ha t of the 
majority of ordinary people,23 it has once again to be observed that it is (a) 
not itself supported by any argument and (b) insufficient to provide the 
desired vindication of conventional morality. 
Taken as a whole, then, the early dialogues fail to realise Plato's project of 
providing that vindication. The theory of motivation which is outlined in 
23
 Commentators are divided on the question of whether Socrates is represented as 
seriously espousing hedonism. I append a list of some writings on either side of the 
dispute. 
For the thesis that he is serious see: 
Grote [289]. vol. 2. pp. 87-9 
J. and A. M. Adam [236]. xxix-xxxiii 
Hackforth [252] 
Vlastos [239]. xl (note) 
Dodds [271]. 21-2 
Crombie [287]. vol. 1. pp. 232-45 (with reservations) 
Irwin [293]. ch. 4 
Taylor [237]. 208-9 
Gosling and Taylor [53]. ch. 3 
Nussbaum [60]. ch. 4 
Cronquist [242] 
Against: 
Taylor [299]. 260-r 
Sullivan [263] 
Raven [291]. 44-9 
Gulley [117]. 110-18 
Vlastos [164] 
Manuwald [258] 
Kahn [175] 
Dyson [245] 
Duncan[244] 
Zeyl[i85] 
Stokes [119]. 358-439 
Kahn [233] and [253]· 
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them requires to be complemented by an account of eudaimonia, but no such 
account is provided. Instead, the whole theory rests on the analogy between 
conventional virtue and bodily health, which begs the crucial question of 
the value of conventional virtue to its possessor. Moreover, that analogy 
threatens the cognitive account of virtue itself; by that account vir tue is 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge of how to achieve eudaimonia, whereas on the 
analogy virtue is eudaimonia itself. If the theory were to fit the analogy, 
knowledge of how to achieve eudaimonia should be analogous to knowledge 
of how to achieve health, i.e. to medicine rather than to health itself. But 
then virtue would be of purely instrumental value, whereas the analogy 
with health represents it as having intrinsic value. A further difficulty is this, 
that the cognitive account of virtue depends on the thesis that a cognitive 
grasp of the good is sufficient to motivate the agent to achieve it, a thesis 
which, though notoriously beset by the counter-evidence of ordinary expe-
rience, is defended by nothing more than a single unsound argument (Meno 
77-8). When we tu rn to the Republic we find Plato developing a more elab-
orate psychology which enables him at the least to make a serious effort to 
remedy these deficiencies, in that it not only provides the material for the 
necessary account of eudaimonia but also allows him to abandon the 
counter-intuitive claims that virtue is knowledge and that it is impossible to 
act contrary to one's conception of one's overall good. 
ii The Republic 
Among the many ways in which the Republic is innovative is its 
attempt at a comprehensive integration of individual psychology with polit-
ical theory. That there was some connection was not. of course, a novel idea; 
naturalistic theories such as those of the Protagoras myth had shown how 
social institutions including morality would naturally have developed in 
response to the needs of individuals for protection and cooperation. 
According to these theories morality was therefore both social, i.e. a set of 
social norms, and natural , i.e. grounded in individual human needs. We saw. 
however, that these theories failed to show that the observance of morality 
by any particular individual is an intrinsic good to that individual. Plato's 
innovation in the Republic may be seen as an attempt to bridge the gap 
between the individual's good and that of the community by internalising 
the social nature of morality, in that the individual personality is itself 
organised on a social model, and its best state, which is the supreme good for 
the individual, consists in a certain social organisation. 
However counter-intuitive, the social conception of individual morality is 
not an arbitrary construction, designed to fill a gap left by earlier theory, but 
has a firm theoretical base. This may be set out as follows. 
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ι Key evaluative predicates such as 'good', 'just', 'courageous ' and 
'self-controlled' are applicable to communities as well as to individ­
uals (368e-369a). 
2 Any predicate which applies both to an individual and to a com­
munity applies to the one in virtue of the same feature or features 
as those in virtue of which it applies to the other (435a-b). 
3 Since the perfectly good individual is wise, self-controlled, coura­
geous and just, by 2 the perfectly good community is wise, self-con­
trolled, courageous and just (427e). 
4 The perfectly good community is just in virtue of the fact t h a t the 
members of the three functionally defined classes into which it is 
divided (rulers, military auxiliaries and economic producers) stick 
to the social function which defines their respective class, and to 
which they are fitted by their natural abilities, developed by 
appropriate education (433a~434c). 
5 The psychology of every individual comprises a tri-partite s tructure 
of intellect, self-assertive motivation and bodily appetite corre­
sponding to the political structure of the perfectly good community 
(435e-44ic). 
6 Therefore, by 2, 4 and 5, the perfectly good individual is just in 
virtue of a relation between the three elements of his or her person­
ality corresponding to that between the classes in the perfectly good 
community which constitutes the justice of that community (see 4) 
(443c-444a)· 
In this derivation premise 2 has a pivotal role, mediating the inferences 
from the character of the individual to that of the community (step 3) and 
conversely (step 6). It is an α priori thesis, which applies to the case of the 
community and the individual 2 4 the Socratic thesis (see above, p. 55) t h a t all 
the things to which a single predicate 'F' applies share a single c o m m o n 
nature in virtue of which they are all Fs. Unfortunately for Plato the thesis 
is false; even leaving aside cases of simple equivocation like 'pen' or 'cape', a 
predicate may apply to things of different kinds, not in virtue of the fact that 
all the things to which it applies share a common nature, but in virtue of the 
fact that each kind of application relates differently to a central n o t i o n . 2 5 
Ironically, 'just' provides a clear example. A political community is just if 
2 4
 The crucial sentence (43535-7) is 'So. if things larger and smaller are called the 
same, are they alike in the respect in which they are called the same, or unlike?' It 
is assumed without argument that the community and the individual are 
examples of 'things larger and smaller'. 
2 5
 As is well known. Aristotle discovered this kind of application. See Met. 
ioo3a33-bi2. EE 1236316-23: for discussion see Owen [928]. 
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either it is internally organised according to just principles, or in its relations 
with other communities it acts according to just principles. An individual, 
however, is just only in the latter way, not in the former, since the notion of 
just principles has no application to the psychological organisation of an 
individual. That is because just principles assign rights and obligations to the 
individuals composing a community, whereas the elements in an individ-
ual's psychological organisation are not themselves individuals, and are 
therefore not subjects of rights and obligations. Even this very crude sketch 
shows that the justice of a principle is the primary application of the predi-
cate 'just', and that communities and individuals are derivatively just in 
virtue of different relations to the primary application. Plato's error is 
twofold, first in assuming the univocity of the predicate, and secondly in 
applying to the individual member of a community an internal, s t ructural 
model of justice appropriate to the complex social entity, not to its individual 
components. 
The identification in step 4 of adherence to one's generic social role as the 
organisational principle of justice in a community may also seem very con-
trived, but this too has some theoretical backing. First, it depends on step 3, 
and therefore on premise 2, on which 3 relies to identify the traditional list of 
individual virtues (see above, p. 52) as the virtues of the perfect community. 
It therefore succumbs to the refutation of 2 in the preceding paragraph. But 
waiving that objection for the sake of argument and granting that the excel-
lence of the perfect community consists in wisdom, courage, self-control and 
justice, what grounds the identification of justice with adherence to one 's 
generic social role? Here Plato appeals to the traditional conception of social 
justice as each one's having his own and doing his own. i.e. that each indi-
vidual should be secure in the possession of what he or she is entitled to and 
should not encroach on the entitlement of another (4336-4343). 
Traditionally this expresses an individualistic principle of ownership, bu t 
Plato transforms it into a collectivist principle of service to the community; 
what belongs to one is above all the contribution one makes to the common 
good, and to be treated unjustly is to be deprived of that contribution, and 
thereby of the good itself, which can be realised (for all) only if each makes 
(and a fortiori is allowed to make) his or her specific contribution to it 
(434a-c). 
Social justice is thus redefined, via the 'doing one 's own and hav ing 
one's own ' principle, as adherence to op t imum social organisa t ion . I 
shall here assume the conclusion for which I have argued e lsewhere . 2 6 
that the criterion of the op t imum social organisation is the maximisa t ion 
In my [368]. 
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of eudaimonia, unders tood as the provision for every member of the 
communi ty of the conditions either for the realisation of eudaimonia or 
for as close an approximation to it as the limitations of the individual 's 
psychological capacities allow. Given tha t account of social just ice, it 
follows by premise 2 tha t individual justice is optimal psychological 
organisat ion, which is tha t very state of eudaimonia which it is t h e func-
tion of social organisat ion to make as widely available as possible. But the 
claim tha t the good for the individual, which it is the aim of social organ-
isation to realise, is opt imum psychological organisat ion advances us 
little beyond the t ru ism tha t the good is living well and doing well. It 
makes some advance, locating doing well in the possession of a cer ta in 
psychological state, ra ther t h a n in the possession of external goods, but 
Heracli tus (D-K 22BI19) and Democritus (D-K 68B170-1) had already 
said as m u c h . If the theory is to say more, and in par t icular if it is to 
provide the vindication of morali ty which eluded the early dialogues, it 
mus t (a) give an account of op t imum psychological organisat ion which 
is both informative and acceptable and (b) justify the claim t h a t that 
account is an account of individual justice. 
Since space is lacking for even the most summary account of t h e psy-
chology of the Republic,27 I must be content with dogmatic s ta tement . 
There are three principal28 elements in the personality, the intellect, the 
bodily appetites, above all those for food, drink and sex, and a loosely 
defined cluster of motivations which Plato calls 'spirit' (thumos or to thu-
moeides), including anger, shame, ambition and a sense of honour or self-
respect, all of which may be understood as aspects of a fundamental 
impulse of self-regard and self-assertiveness.29 The intellect is not a purely 
ratiocinative faculty, but has its own motivations; hence the tri-parti t ion is 
at least in part a distinction between three kinds of motivation, towards 
intellectual activity, self-realisation and bodily satisfaction respectively. 
But in addition to providing its own specific motivations the intellect has 
the function of directing and co-ordinating the activity of all three kinds 
of motivation with a view to the realisation of the agent 's overall good, 
since only the intellect is capable of the grasp of the good presupposed by 
that direction and co-ordination. There are therefore two ways in which 
the intellect is supreme in the state of optimal psychological organisat ion. 
First, all the agent 's specific desires are directed by the intellect with a view 
to the agent 's overall good, and secondly, that good consists in a life in 
which the satisfaction of the specific desires of the intellect (i.e. desires for 
27
 See. for instance. Woods [353]. 
28
 Rep. 443d7 explicitly leaves open the possibility that there may be others. 
29
 See Gosling [288]. ch. 3. Cf. Rawls [966]. 
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intellectual activity) takes priority over the satisfaction of the other kinds 
of desire. The satisfaction of intellectual desire should be understood as 
neither purely theoretical nor (because purely theoretical) exclusively ego-
istic; according to the metaphysical system of the Republic, the supreme 
object of understanding is the Form of the good, and someone who grasps 
what goodness itself is is thereby motivated to realise it not merely in his 
own life but (by the theory of love of the Symposium and Phaedrus) in the 
lives of those he loves and in the community of which he is a member. 
A central feature of this psychology is Plato's abandonment of the theory 
of uniform motivation which was presupposed in the early dialogues, and 
with it the Cognitive Theory of Excellence and the strong version of the unity 
of virtue which that theory implied. Plato no longer accepts either the strong 
thesis that every intentional action is aimed at the realisation of the agent's 
conception of his or her overall good nor the weaker thesis that whenever 
that conception is present it motivates, since the bodily and 'spirited' 
appetites motivate independently of, and even in opposition to, the concep-
tion of the overall good. Hence what makes the difference between the virtu-
ous and the non-virtuous agent is not simply the possession by the former of 
a cognitive state which the latter lacks, but the possession by the former of a 
psychological structure lacking in the latter, in which the specific desires are 
appropriately responsive to the direction of the intellect. And that 
responsiveness is not guaranteed by the content of the intellect's direction, 
but requires that the specific desires should have been conditioned by the 
process of education described in books 11-111 to respond instinctively to the 
guidance of the intellect by loving what the intellect reveals as good and 
hating what it reveals as bad. Since what is manifested in the various types 
of virtuous conduct is no longer a single cognitive state, the former version 
of the unity thesis has to go. But since by the new theory it is the same 
psychological structure which is manifested in those types of conduct, it 
might seem that the strong theory could survive the shift from cognitive 
state to total structure, with 'courage*, 'wisdom', etc. functioning as non-
synonymous names of that total structure. 
In fact the shift is more substantial, for two reasons. First, it seems that 
those names apply, not to the same total structure under different aspects. 
but to different aspects of the structure; thus self-control is 'a certain order-
ing and mastery of pleasures and appetites' (430e) while justice is the state 
in which each element plays its proper part in the optimal structure, wisdom 
is the care of the intellect for the whole (44id-e), and courage is the reten-
tion by the spirit, despite pleasures and pains, of the instructions of the intel-
lect about what is to be feared and what is not (442c). While justice and 
self-control are hard to distinguish on this account (except that the terms are 
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non-synonymous), courage and wisdom are not the total structure itself but 
aspects of it, ascribed in the first instance to particular elements of that 
structure. Secondly, the possibility of disorderly appetite indicates t h a t while 
self-control and justice are not only mutually necessitating but severally 
impossible without wisdom, the possession of wisdom does not guarantee 
self-control. It appears, then, that the psychology of the Republic requires the 
abandonment of the unity of virtue doctrine, in that even the weakest form 
of that doctrine, the thesis that anyone who possesses any of the virtues nec-
essarily possesses them all, has to be replaced by a still weaker thesis, namely 
that courage, self-control and justice all require wisdom (and perhaps 
require one another also), but wisdom does not guarantee the presence of 
the other virtues. 
Does Plato give us adequate reason to accept that this psychological 
organisation is in fact optimal? To do so he has to show that each of the ele-
ments in the psychological s t ructure functions at its best when co-ordi-
nated by the intellect so as to make the appropriate contribution to a life 
where the highest priority is given to the pursuit of intellectual satisfac-
tions. We may accept on the basis of the a rgument against Callicles (see 
above) tha t a satisfactory life is possible for the individual only if his or her 
potentially conflicting motivations are intentionally co-ordinated, which is 
a rational process requiring the identification of priorities and long-term 
goals. But we need further a rgument to show that the supreme long-term 
goal of the optimal life must be the theoretical unders tanding of reality (of 
which the primary object of understanding is goodness), and the realisa-
tion of that unders tanding in practical, including political, life. Plato 
at tempts to meet this challenge by arguing in book ix tha t the life devoted 
to those goals is the pleasantest life possible, but his a rguments are unsat -
isfactory. He gives two main arguments : the first (famously recalled by Mill 
in Utilitarianism) is tha t the devotee of intellectual pleasures is the 
appropriate judge of which life is the pleasantest, since he has experience 
of the pleasures of appetite and ambition (the dominant goals of t he rival 
lives), whereas the adherents of those pleasures lack experience of intel-
lectual pleasures. This a rgument fails because experience of the pleasures 
of a life requires commitment to the activities and the values consti tut ing 
tha t life, but the intellectual is as remote from immersion in the rival lives 
as the rivals are from the intellectual life. The second a rgument depends on 
the conception of pleasure as the making good of a deficiency in the organ-
ism (for example hunger is a state of bodily depletion and ignorance a state 
of intellectual depletion, and the pleasures of satisfying hunger and of dis-
covery are the processes of making good the respective depletions). Plato 
uses this model to make two basic points, whose relation to one ano the r is 
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obscure; the first is that since the state of bodily depletion is painful, what 
we think of as bodily pleasures are in fact mostly episodes of getting rid of 
pain, not genuine pleasure. The second is that whereas bodily deficiencies 
cannot be properly or genuinely made good, intellectual deficiencies can 
be. Leaving aside the question of the adequacy of the depletion model in 
general, its application in this argument is highly obscure, since it is 
unclear whether the inferiority of bodily pleasures is supposed to lie in the 
fact that they require to be repeated (since, for instance, one gets hungry 
again a few hours after having eaten) or in the alleged insatiability of the 
desires which they presuppose (so that one can never get enough food) or 
simply in the alleged confusion between bodily pleasure and the getting rid 
of bodily distress. If the point is the latter, Plato's diagnosis of the alleged 
confusion is itself confused, since the depletion model yields the result that 
the process of making good the depletion is pleasant, irrespective of 
whether the depletion is painful. Hence whenever the depletion is painful, 
getting rid of that painful lack will be genuinely pleasant, and there will be 
no confusion of genuine pleasure with something else, namely the getting 
rid of pain. If, on the other hand, the target is the insatiability of bodily 
desires, the alleged fact should be denied; normal bodily desires are not 
insatiable, unless 'insatiable' is reinterpreted as 'recurrent', in which case 
the point is after all the first, i.e. that bodily desires are recurrent whereas 
intellectual desires are not. But with respect to that point it is not clear that 
the need for recurrent satisfaction differentiates a life devoted to bodily 
satisfactions from one devoted to intellectual; no doubt a truth once dis-
covered does not have to be rediscovered, but a meal once eaten does not 
have to be eaten over again, and an intellectual life will require repeated 
acts of thought (whether new discoveries or the recapitulation of truths 
already known) no less than a life of bodily satisfactions will require 
repeated episodes of bodily pleasure. (The point also applies to the plea-
sures of the life of ambition, which is for the purposes of the argument 
required to share the defects of the life of bodily pleasure, but which is in 
fact barely mentioned.)30 
Plato does not, then, succeed in establishing the optimality of his pre-
ferred psychological structure. Does he fare any better in showing that that 
structure captures the nature of justice as a virtue of the agent? Since his 
account of justice is avowedly revisionary, he cannot be held to the 
requirement to show that the presence of that structure in an agent is nec-
essary and sufficient for that person's being just by ordinary standards. 
For fuller discussion of the arguments of Rep. ix see Annas [325], ch. 12: Gosling 
and Taylor [53]. chs. 6 and 17.2; Stokes [119]. 
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Someone who conforms consistently to ordinary morality as it is depicted 
by Glaucon3 1 is just by ordinary standards but not by Plato's, s ince his 
commitment to justice is conditioned, not by acceptance of the va lue of 
justice for itself, but by the belief that he could not succeed in doing what 
he would really like to do, viz. to promote his own interests at the expense 
of others. The most that can be required is that Plato should show t h a t the 
presence of the s tructure is sufficient for the performance of a sufficient 
range of central cases of just dealing and the corresponding avoidance of 
unjust dealing. At 442e -443a Socrates asserts that the Platonically just 
agent will never commit any major crime such as theft, sacrilege, t reason 
or adultery, and while he gives no argument we may concede t h a t the 
control of appetite which characterises such an agent will make h i m proof 
against the s tandard temptations to such wickedness. Moreover, as we saw, 
his love for the good will make him concerned for the good of o the r s and 
for that of the community. How, then, could he fail to be just by conven-
tional s tandards?3 2 
The flaw in the theory is that the structure itself defines the good for the 
agent; hence concern for the good of others and for that of the communi ty 
is concern to maintain that s tructure in others and the corresponding 
structure in the community. Consequently just actions are redefined as 
whatever actions serve to create and preserve that structure, and unjust as 
whatever destroy it (443e). That redefinition clearly licenses substantial 
interference with the autonomy of others, with a view to the promotion of 
their own good (as redefined) or the good of the community; indeed, if the 
setting up of the ideal Platonic state required extermination and enslave-
ment of whole populations, by this account such acts would be just (not 
merely permitted, but required). This is explicitly acknowledged in t h e text: 
at 540e— 541a Socrates recommends the foundation of the ideal state by the 
process of expelling the whole population of an existing city over the age of 
ten, taking the children from their parents and bringing them up in the 
educational system which he has just described. Plainly the forced evacua-
tion of an entire city and the enforced separation of a complete generation 
are acts of extreme violence, which could not in practice be perpetrated 
without considerable loss of life. As regards loss of autonomy, the subjection 
of the lowest class in the ideal state is complete enough for their state to be 
31
 This assumes that ordinary morality is not so confused as to make consistent 
adherence to it impossible. It is not clear that Plato would accept that charitable 
assumption: the arguments against the accounts of justice proposed in Republic 1 
by Cephalus and Polemarchus suggest that he thinks that ordinary moral beliefs 
are thoroughly confused. 
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 See Sachs [363]: Demos [357]: Vlastos [365]: Irwin [293]. ch. 7. secs. 10-11 and 19. 
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described as one of slavery (590C-CI); it is, of course, paternalistic slavery, 
since it is better for the lower classes to be enslaved to those who have their 
good at heart and who know what that good is than to be enslaved to their 
own lower nature and to mistaken conceptions of what is good for t hem. Yet 
it is slavery none the less, since in the last resort the direction of their lives 
rests not with their own intellect and will, but with those of the rulers . The 
platonically just agent will not, therefore, be unjust from the vulgar motives 
of private gain or personal lust, but he will not be just for all that . The form 
of injustice to which he will be prone is something much more terrible, the 
enforcement of an ideology which, in virtue of its comprehensiveness and 
its redefinition of benevolence, admits no limitation in the name of individ-
ual liberty, and is therefore liable to press its claims to the extremes of 
tyranny.33 
iii Developments subsequent to the Republic 
The ethical theory of the Republic represents Plato's most sustained 
attempt to vindicate the claims of morality. Subsequent developments in his 
ethical thought narrowly conceived (i.e. as distinct from political theory, 
which requires separate treatment) amount to modifications of detail, no t to 
any radical shift of view. They may therefore be dealt with briefly. 
The second of the two stages which we have distinguished in the 
development of Plato's ethical t hough t was marked off from the earl ier by 
the abandonment of the 'Socratic' theory of uniform motivation and 
hence by the rejection of the Cognitive Theory of Excellence a n d the 
thesis of the unity of virtue. In the dialogues subsequent to the Republic 
the non-uniform character of motivation is even more strongly e m p h a -
sised, while in the Statesman he insists on the disunity of vir tue (see below, 
p. 74). These developments may be attributed in par t to an increasing 
sense of the dichotomy, already present but not dominan t in the Republic 
( 6 n a - d ) . between the rational element in the personality, motivated 
by the good and only contingently and temporarily embodied, a n d the 
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 Plato is quite explicit in drawing the implication at Statesman 293C-d: 
[T]he only constitution worthy of the name . . . must be the one in 
which the rulers are . . . men really possessed of the scientific 
understanding of the art of government. Then we must not take into 
consideration whether their rule be by laws or without them over 
willing or unwilling subjects or whether they themselves be rich or 
poor men. 
No. 
They may purge the city for its better health by putting some of the 
citizens to death or banishing others, (tr. Skemp from [385]) 
A similar view is expressed at Ixiws 735b-736c. 
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non-ra t ional spirit and appetites, which spring from the body a n d are 
motivated independently of the good.34 To the extent tha t the r ea son is 
identified with the real self, spirit and appetite come to be seen r a t h e r as 
alien forces requiring to be kept in subjection by reason t h a n as 
manifestations of a uniformly rational agency. This allows Plato, despite 
having abandoned the thesis tha t knowledge of wha t is best is sufficient 
for doing what is best, to cont inue to main ta in the second of the Socratic 
paradoxes, tha t no one voluntarily acts wrongly. Contrary to the Socratic 
position, action against one's better judgement is possible; bu t such 
action is not voluntary, since the agent (= the rat ional self) is over-
whelmed by external forces, i.e. the non-rat ional passions (Timaeus 86e, 
Laws 734b, 860—3). On the Socratic model, all purported cases of act ion 
against one 's better judgement had to be explained as cases of intellectual 
error; Plato now recognises tha t some cases have to be explained by a mis-
match between intellectual judgement and passion, but saves t h e doc-
tr ine by count ing such mismatches as sources of involuntary act ion. 3 5 
That saving move has its cost, in tha t it breaks up the uni ty of the agent , 
but Plato's dichotomy of rational and non-rat ional elements in t h e per-
sonality, itself a reflection of the more fundamental dichotomy of ra t ion-
ally apprehended reality and the imperfectly rat ional material world, 
already encourages tha t split. The split is, however, fatal to the project of 
vindicating morality by showing it to be constitutive of the best life for the 
agent. For morality concerns the embodied agent, whereas the best life for 
the agent is the discarnate life of pure though t (Tim. 90). The mos t tha t 
Plato could hope to provide by way of vindication of morality would 
therefore be the claim that immorality as ordinarily conceived h inders the 
achievement of that life (Tim. 90). 
This fundamental dichotomy tends to drive Plato further from the doc-
trine of the unity of virtue: if wisdom is in the last analysis the activity of 
the immortal 'real self and courage, self-control and justice different 
u
 In the Phaedo the appetitive and spirited motivations are attributed to the body 
(66b-c. 68b-c). which is sharply distinguished from the (rational) soul, whose task 
is to master and control the body (80a). The rational soul is implicitly identified 
with the self: the survival of the self is the survival of the soul, and the task of the 
philosopher is to prepare for what is ordinarily thought of as death, but which is in 
fact the fullness of life, free from the distractions of the body (64c~69e). While it 
might seem obvious that on this model also the motivations of the body are 
independent of the good, it is not clear that that is so. since the body is also 
described as a source of illusions, i.e. false beliefs (81b. 83d). Hence the spurious 
morality of the non-philosopher, guided by a calculation of bodily pleasures 
(68D-69C). is. although undoubtedly a state of enslavement of the soul to the body. 
nevertheless not incompatible with the Socratic theory of motivation. 
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aspects of the subjection of the mortal and non-rational by that self, then 
the connection between the virtues has been loosened to the extent that, 
so far from being in any sense the same virtue, they are no longer even 
virtues of literally the same subject. Rather, the perfection of the real self 
requires, contingently and temporarily, the co-operation of the mortal self. 
This co-operation consists in the exercise of the four cardinal virtues, 
wisdom, sôphrosunê, justice and courage (Laws 631c), as is brought out in 
a later passage (653a-c) describing the general aim of education. This is 
essentially that of the primary education of the Republic, so to train the 
motivational impulses by means of the basic stimuli of pleasure and pain 
that the child comes to like what reason dictates and to hate what reason 
forbids. The affective responses are formed before the rational judgements, 
but when the child is mature enough to form those judgements they agree 
with the content of the affective responses 'and this agreement as a whole 
is arete' (653b6). This formula may plausibly suggest an account of what 
courage, sôphrosunê and justice have in common; each is an agreement 
between a specific motivational impulse and a rational judgement,36 or 
(perhaps closer to the theory of the Republic) each is an aspect of a state of 
agreement between the agent's motivations taken globally and the deliver-
ances of his or her reason. There is, however, still the problem of what 
wisdom itself has in common with those virtues whose essence consists in 
agreement between the non-rational and wisdom. It may be a sense of this 
difficulty which prompts Plato to say at the end of the work (963) that 
while it is not hard to see how the virtues differ from one another, it is a real 
problem to explain how states as different as courage and wisdom are one, 
i.e. to determine what they have in common; this problem he leaves unan-
swered. 
I suggest that this problem reflects Plato's difficulties in fitting his account 
of virtue to his sense of the dichotomy between the mortal and immortal ele-
ments in the soul. That same difficulty is also. I think, reflected in another 
feature of the treatment of the virtues in the later dialogues, namely that 
Plato sometimes reverts to the earlier 'Presocratic' tradition of treating them 
as separable components of excellence, as when he asserts that the state in 
which justice, wisdom (phronêsis) and sôphrosunê are 'unified together with 
courage' is better than courage alone (63oa-b). citing as an example of the 
latter, as Protagoras had done in opposition to Socrates (Prot. 349d), the 
Jh
 Compare Aristotle's account of the conditions of correct choice in EN ι i39a22-6: 
'since excellence of character is a disposition concerned with choice, and choice is 
deliberative desire, for this reason the judgement (logos) must be true and the desire 
right, if the choice is to be good, and the one must say the same thing as the other 
pursues'. 
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courage of wicked and licentious soldiers (cf. 696b-e). The conception of 
courage as a non-rational impulse combating fear, to be found even in 
animals (cf. Lach. I97a-b) , recurs at Laws 963e and at Statesman 306 . In the 
latter passage the Eleatic Stranger goes out of his way to emphasise the unho-
mogeneity of the specific virtues, by first stating the conventional view of 
courage and sôphrosunê as parts of total excellence, and then urging the 
'unfamiliar' thesis (3o6bi3) that they are hostile and opposed to each other, 
in the sense that courage, understood as an aggressive impulse, is opposed to 
sôphrosunê, understood as an impulse to quiet and unassertive behaviour. It 
is the task of the statesman to devise forms of education and political institu-
tions which will harmonise these opposed impulses for the benefit of the 
individual and the community. Here once again we see Plato apparently 
reverting to conceptions of the specific virtues which were rejected in the 
early dialogues, courage as aggressiveness in Laches ( i97a-b) , sôphrosunê as 
quietness in Charmides ( i59b- i6ob) . 3 7 In so doing he ignores the crucial dis-
tinction between motivational drives and the proper organisation of those in 
the integrated personality which was one of the main achievements of his 
mature theory, and thereby generates a spurious paradox. Aggressiveness 
may indeed be opposed to quietness, but courage is not opposed to sôphro-
sunê, since both are aspects of a structure of motivations organised under 
the direction of the intellect. 
17
 There is even a trace of these conceptions in Meno 88a-c, where Socrates, arguing 
that knowledge is the only unconditional good, includes the virtues of sôphrosunê. 
courage and justice (as well as learning, good memory, personal splendour 'and 
everything of that kind') among the things which are good only on condition that 
they are directed by knowledge (i.e. directed aright), but which are harmful if 
misdirected. But in fact this passage seems to draw the very distinction between 
motivational drive and virtue proper which is blurred in the later dialogues. For 
Socrates asks Meno whether, if it is not the case that the virtues are sometimes 
beneficial and sometimes harmful, they can be anything other than knowledge. 
For instance, if courage is not intelligence (phronêsis) but a sort of boldness, is it not 
the case that when someone is bold without thought (nous) he is harmed, but 
when he is bold with thought he is benefited? After citing the examples of 
sôphrosunê and learning Socrates concludes as follows (ci—5): 
So to sum up. all the undertakings and endurances of the soul result in 
eudaimonia if they are directed by intelligence, but in the opposite if 
they are directed by folly. 
So it seems. 
If excellence, then, is one of the things in the soul and it is necessary 
that it should be beneficial, it must be intelligence . . . 
'Undertakings and endurances of the soul', i.e. the acts which one is prompted to 
by motivational drives, are clearly distinguished from excellence, which is identified 
as knowledge. It follows that courage, for example, which is acknowledged to be a 
part of excellence (see above), is not itself a motivational drive such as boldness. 
but is itself knowledge. 
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I confess to being puzzled as to why Plato should have blurred this 
distinction (which is central to Aristotle's theory of virtue as well as to 
Plato's own) in his later writings; all that I can suggest is that his sense of the 
discontinuity between the rational and immortal elements in the personal-
ity on the one hand and the non-rational and mortal on the other may have 
made him uncomfortable with accounts of the specific virtues as modifica-
tions of the latter by the directive activity of the former. According to the 
theory of the Republic, the specific virtues, while no longer a single vir tue as 
in the early dialogues, are still virtues of a single subject; yet the a rgumen t 
of Rep. x . 6 n b - d that since the soul is immortal and what is immortal c anno t 
be composite the tri-partite soul is not the true soul leads to the conclusion 
that the tri-partite soul is not a genuine unity, but rather an adventitious 
agglomerate of disparate elements, like the sea-god Glaucus overgrown with 
shells and weed. If Plato takes that conclusion seriously, then there is no 
single subject for all the specific virtues; wisdom is an attribute of the immor-
tal soul, and the other virtues attributes of the mortal elements, which may 
have made it easier to revert sometimes to the traditional view of t h e m as 
non-rational impulses, requiring the direction of reason to attain the s ta tus 
of true virtues. Of course, one need not conceive of them in that way, since 
the dualistic conception of the soul still allows the alternative (closer to the 
Aristotelian view) that, for example, 'courage' is not the name of a non-
rational impulse requiring to be modified by reason, but the name of the 
state of having that impulse properly modified by reason, which seems to be 
the view which predominates in the Laws. There seems, then, to be evidence 
of some vacillation in the conception of the virtues in the later dialogues, 
which may perhaps be explained by the increased influence in this period of 
the dichotomy between the rational and non-rational in Plato's view of the 
soul. 
The above account of the 'moral ' virtues as consisting in agreement 
between affective responses and rational judgement, produced by the pre-
rational training of the non-rational elements in the personality, has close 
and obvious affinities with Aristotle's theory, on which it was doubtless an 
influence. Another similarity between Plato's later theory and Aristotle's is 
found in the section of the Laws (66oe-663d) where the Athenian Stranger 
discusses the requirement in an adequate code of legislation to show tha t the 
good man will be eudaimön and the wicked wretched. Since the point of this 
provision in a code of legislation is to motivate people to obey the law, it is 
assumed, in line with the generally hedonistic account of motivation which 
is taken for granted in the Laws (see. for example. 636d-e) that the appropri-
ate way to show that the good agent will be eudaimön is to show that his or 
her life will be pleasant, and the rival lives unpleasant. The strategy is tha t of 
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Rep. ix, but the arguments have none of the metaphysical elaboration of 
those employed there. Instead, the Stranger argues simply that everyone sees 
his or her own preferred life as pleasantest from its own perspective, and that 
the correct perspective from which the assessment should be made is that of 
the virtuous agent (663b-d). No attempt is made to support this principle; 
Plato does not, for instance, employ the analogy, to which Aristotle some-
times appeals (see, for instance, EN ii73b22-5, H76a8-22), with the per-
ception of the healthy as the criterion of correctness in judgements of 
sensible qualities such as colour or taste. 
The central theme of this chapter has been Plato's attempt to anchor moral-
ity on the 'natural' side of the nature—convention dichotomy by grounding 
it in an adequate theory of human nature. That theory develops from the 
optimistic over-simplification of the early dialogues to the more complex psy-
chology of the middle and later periods, leading to a picture of the virtuous 
agent as one who achieves through intellectual and emotional training the 
right fit between intellectual judgement and affective response. That picture 
of the ideally developed agent was perhaps Plato's most important legacy to 
his successors, from Aristotle through the Stoics to Christian theorists and 
their post-Christian followers. But the theory underlying the picture faced 
the problems (a) of giving an account of the element of intellectual judge-
ment which would justify its claim to truth and (b) of defending the integrity 
of the personality against the threat of dualism, in which the intellect arro-
gates value to itself, and the affective elements in the personality are 
correspondingly devalued along with the body. Plato himself solved neither 
problem: both are visible in Aristotle. Stoicism and Christianity, while at least 
the former remains to trouble their 'realist' successors.38 
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